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INTRODUCTION 
In their wide-ranging and thought-provoking article, A Market for 
Sovereign Control, Joseph Blocher and Mitu Gulati argue that 
territorial sovereignty is a commodity that can and should be subject to 
market forces.1 In this Response, I first identify the two different types 
of deals—friendly and hostile—that can occur within a market for 
sovereign control. I then discuss some of the obstacles that may impede 
the successful conclusion of each type of deal. 
In friendly deals, all of the affected parties consent to the transfer 
of territory from one sovereign to another. The most significant 
barriers to friendly deals are not legal. They are political. In the 
modern era, there are few (if any) incentives for national political 
leaders on the seller side to participate in such a market. Until these 
incentives change, I argue, it is unlikely that a robust market for 
sovereign control will develop with respect to friendly deals. 
In hostile deals, one sovereign refuses to consent to the 
annexation of one of its regions by another sovereign. In these 
situations, Blocher and Gulati argue that the rules of international law 
should be rewritten to permit the annexation over the objections of the 
Copyright © 2017 John F. Coyle. 
 †  Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
1. See Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, 66 DUKE L.J. 797,
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original sovereign provided certain conditions are met. I argue that the 
nations of the world are unlikely to consent to the rewriting of these 
rules. I argue further that there is no obvious means—short of the use 
of force—by which these new rules could be enforced against nations 
that refuse to obey them.  Until these rule-making and rule-enforcing 
obstacles are overcome, it is also unlikely that a robust market for 
sovereign control will develop with respect to hostile deals. 
I.  FRIENDLY DEALS IN THE MARKET FOR SOVEREIGN CONTROL 
In a friendly deal for sovereign control, all of the relevant parties 
consent to the transfer of sovereignty. The existing parent nation 
agrees to sell the region. The new parent nation agrees to buy the 
region. And the population of the affected region votes to proceed with 
the transfer. There is nothing in customary international law (CIL) that 
currently prohibits nations from engaging in friendly deals.2 If the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland were to work out an 
agreement whereby sovereign control over Northern Ireland would be 
transferred to Ireland in exchange for a large sum of money, subject to 
the approval by the people of Northern Ireland, it would be entirely 
permissible under contemporary CIL. This fact notwithstanding, and 
despite the fact that the historical record is replete with examples of 
friendly deals for sovereign control, they are essentially unknown in 
contemporary international relations. 
If friendly deals are permitted under international law, and if such 
deals were common in the past but no longer occur today, then the 
question that naturally arises is why. The answer is that the practice is 
no longer politically viable. Blocher and Gulati acknowledge this. They 
observe that nations may resist the transfer of sovereignty because they 
view the loss of territory as a blow to their national pride.3 Blocher and 
Gulati then go on to argue, however, that economic self-interest may 
trump national pride under certain conditions. Specifically, they argue 
that freely negotiated sales of sovereign control are most likely to occur 




 2. 2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 682 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th 
ed. 1996); cf. Joseph Blocher, Selling State Borders, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 241 (2014) (discussing the 
history of friendly deals among states in the United States). 
 3. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 1, at 829. 
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1) Low or non-existent population in the region; 
2) Economic crisis in the parent nation; 
3) Identifiable physical resources in the region; 
4) Simple boundaries, as in the case of islands; 
5) The existence of cross-border affinities between the region 
and another country; 
6) Linkages between regions and forms of compensation; 
7) Lack of a history of violent conflict; and 
8) High-functioning domestic institutions.4 
One could debate which direction several of these factors cut. The 
presence of valuable physical resources in the region, for example, may 
actually make it more difficult to agree to a price than would be the 
case in their absence. Negotiations over barren tundra are likely to be 
less fraught than negotiations over oil fields. Overall, however, this list 
of factors illustrates the “best-case scenario” under which mutually 
agreeable transfers of sovereign control are most likely to occur. Even 
when many of these factors are met, however, history suggests that the 
political obstacles to such voluntary transfers remain formidable. 
Consider the case of Hans Island. Hans Island is located between 
Canada and Greenland.5 It is tiny (less than half a square mile) and 
uninhabited. Not counting seals, there are no known natural resources 
on the island. It is, quite literally, a rock in the middle of the Arctic 
Ocean. Over the past forty years, Canada and Denmark have 
squabbled as to which country owns Hans Island on a number of 
occasions. In 2005, the Canadian defense minister landed on the island 
and erected a Canadian flag.6 Denmark responded by filing a 
complaint stating that “we consider Hans Island to be part of Danish 
territory, and will therefore hand over a complaint about the Canadian 
minister’s unannounced visit.”7 The dispute continues to this day. 
The Hans Island conflict presents a number of promising factors 
from the list above. The Island is uninhabited. The physical resources 
 
 4. Id. at 837–38. 
 5. Christopher Stevenson, Hans Off!: The Struggle for Hans Island and the Potential 
Ramifications for International Border Dispute Resolution, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 263, 
263 (2007). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Hans Off! Canada and Denmark’s Arctic Dispute, WORLDATLAS (Sept. 19, 2016), http://
www.worldatlas.com/articles/hans-island-boundary-dispute-canada-denmark-territorial-conflict.
html [https://perma.cc/8XVG-CV9S]. 
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on the island are known and (presumably) easy to value. The island has 
clearly defined boundaries. There is no history of violent conflict 
between Canada and Denmark. And both nations have high-
functioning domestic institutions. Hans Island would seem to be the 
ideal case in which one nation might be willing to sell a region to 
another nation for the right price. And yet the dispute endures. It 
seems impossible to imagine that the governments of Canada and 
Denmark are unaware that the sale of sovereign control is permissible. 
In the past, each nation has negotiated for the sale or purchase of 
territory.8 Instead, it appears that each government has decided that 
the political costs of “losing” a piece of territory to another nation—
even if that territory is a rock in the middle of the Arctic Ocean—
outweigh the monetary benefits to be gained from its sale. 
A similar dynamic can be seen with respect to the chain of eight 
islands—known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan and the Diaoyu 
Islands in China—located in the East China Sea.9 These islands, like 
Hans Island, are small and uninhabited. Unlike Hans Island, however, 
these islands offer rich fishing grounds and are geographically 
proximate to oil and gas reserves.10 Although the islands are currently 
controlled by Japan, China asserts that they have been part of its 
territory since the sixteenth century.11 There is, again, no rule of 
international law standing in the way of a cash settlement to resolve 
the dispute. Such a settlement seems unlikely to occur, however, 
because each interested government perceives the political costs of 
selling territory to a rival to outweigh any possible sum of cash that 
might be offered in exchange. 
Political scientists use the term “audience costs” to describe the 
penalty that a national leader incurs when he is seen to back down in 
an international crisis.12 When the crisis involves a dispute over a 
nation’s territory, the threat of such a penalty—up to and including 
 
 8. In 1916, Denmark sold several islands in the West Indies to the United States for $25 
million. 2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 682. In 1870, Canada purchased 
a vast swath of territory known as Rupert’s Land from the Hudson’s Bay Company for 300,000 
pounds. Michael Jeffery, Public Lands Reform: A Reluctant Leap into the Abyss, 16 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 79, 93 (1996). 
 9. See Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, International Law’s Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku 
Islands, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 903, 903–04 (2008). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See James D. Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International 
Disputes, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 577, 577 (1994). 
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removal from office—is particularly serious because territorial 
disputes with other nations tend to galvanize public opinion in a way 
that many other international disputes do not.13 As Douglas Gibler and 
Marc Hutchison have argued: 
Not all foreign policies will be salient to the public since crises vary so 
widely in their importance to the average individual. Most seizures of 
ships or goods by foreign powers, for example, matter little to the 
average individual who is unaffected by the outcome of the crisis. 
Contrast these cases, however, with any threat of occupation . . . of 
homeland territories. While rarer, these are the issues that will 
galvanize public opinion in the threatened state. Leader 
pronouncements will be watched closely by the public, and there will 
be less room available for the leader to maneuver during the crisis. . . .  
. . . There is good evidence that territorial issues may be one of the 
most consistently salient issues to domestic populations.14 
The long-simmering disputes over Hans Island and the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands do not remain unresolved because politicians 
are unaware that sovereign territory may be bought and sold.15 They 
remain unresolved because these politicians do not wish to incur the 
audience costs that would be imposed if the leaders were to back down. 
Recall that all of these islands are uninhabited. Presumably, the 
audience costs would be even higher if the region in question were 
inhabited. 
When viewed through the lens of audience costs, the introduction 
of cash payments to these disputes seems unlikely to have a meaningful 
impact on a national leader’s incentives to participate in a voluntary 
market for sovereign control, at least on the seller side.16 The fact that 
 
 13. Douglas M. Gibler & Marc L. Hutchison, Territorial Issues, Audience Costs, and the 
Democratic Peace: The Importance of Issue Salience, 75 J. POL. 879, 882–83 (2013). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Stephen M. Walt, Why Doesn’t China Just Buy the Senkaku Islands?, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Sept. 21, 2012), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/21/why-doesnt-china-just-buy-the-
senkaku-islands-updated [https://perma.cc/3JBC-C4LA] (“The main obstacle to this obvious 
solution [buying the islands] is nationalism. China regards the islands as Chinese territory, so why 
should they pay Japan in order to get something they think is rightfully theirs? Similarly, some 
Japanese might regard selling the islands as an affront to their own national pride, or something 
like that, even though nobody in Japan is likely to live there or even get anywhere near the remote 
little rocks.”).  
 16. James D. Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 49 INT’L ORG. 379, 389–90 (1995) 
(“In practice, creating intermediate settlements with cash . . . often seems difficult or impossible 
for states engaged in a dispute. . . . [N]ineteenth- and twentieth-century leaders cannot divide up 
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the parent nation will receive a sum of money is of little consequence 
to a leader who will be pilloried and driven out of office if the territory 
is lost.17 Ceding sovereign territory to another nation in exchange for 
cash is rarely a winning political strategy.18 Even when Greece was 
mired in a devastating economic crisis and considering leaving the 
Eurozone, its leaders steadfastly refused to consider the idea of selling 
any of its islands. As one Greek politician put it: “It’s an affront . . . . 
It’s basically saying sell the memory of your ancestors, sell your history 
just so we can get something commercial for it . . . . This is an idea to 
humiliate Greeks.”19 
In short, the political obstacles to the successful conclusion of 
friendly deals in the market for sovereign control are immense. Blocher 
and Gulati acknowledge this. They devote an entire section of their 
Article to addressing what they call the “impossibility” argument.20 
They concede that the “attachment to land might well be resistant to 
pricing” and that “domestic political pressure will probably prefer 
acquisition or retention of territory . . . to a change in the inscrutable 
national balance sheet.”21 They do not, however, suggest any 
mechanism by which these political obstacles may be overcome. This 
 
and trade territory in international negotiations as easily as could rulers in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries[.]”). 
 17. Pass the Hemlock, ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/ 2153
8697 [https://perma.cc/4VU5-YPE6] (“[A]s long as Greece remains a democracy, the political, 
and perhaps biological, lifespan of a leader who proposed hauling down the flag over even the 
tiniest Aegean outcrop would be measured in hours.”). 
 18. See John Ibbitson, How Will Quebec React?, GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 12, 2003, at A25 
(“Lester Pearson, Pierre Trudeau, Brian Mulroney and Jean Chrétien all had reason to fear that 
they could be the prime minister who lost Quebec.”); John Stevens & Tom McTague, David 
Cameron Could Be Forced to Resign as Prime Minister if Scotland Votes ‘Yes’ to Independence, 
Warns Top Tory, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2723916/
David-Cameron-forced-resign-Prime-Minister-Scotland-votes-Yes-independence-warns-Tory.
html [https://perma.cc/2S4H-GL4W] (quoting a member of parliament as saying that “[h]e would 
become known as the prime minister who gambled on keeping Scotland in the union and lost his 
gamble. [It would be] very difficult in those circumstances to see how he could continue for any 
very great length of time”); Rigoberto D. Tiglao, Opinion, Aquino, the First President to  
Lose Philippine Territory, MANILA TIMES (May 31, 2015), http://www.manilatimes.net/aquino-
the-first-president-to-lose-philippine-territory/188031 [https://perma.cc/8MSX-GJR5] (“I was 
shocked at this reality that we have lost Panatag Shoal, and angry with this government . . . . I 
think the Chinese haven’t stopped laughing at the Aquino government, rolling on the ground as 
they point their fingers at Trillanes and del Rosario.”). 
 19. Simon Shuster, Greek May Have to Sell Islands and Ruins Under Its Bailout Deal, TIME 
(July 13, 2015), http://time.com/3956017/greece-bailout-selloff [https://perma.cc/4GYW-KV4B]. 
 20. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 1, at 837–40. 
 21. Id. at 837. 
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omission is important because they suggest that the creation of a 
market for sovereign control has the potential to bring about real 
change in the real world. They note that the “practical implications [of 
their proposal] are significant,”22 that their “framework suggests 
possible solutions . . . to . . . difficult practical questions,”23 and that the 
framework “point[s] toward practical solutions by helping to identify 
the legal, political, ethical, or other obstacles that prevent welfare-
enhancing border changes.”24 These statements notwithstanding, 
Blocher and Gulati devote little attention to the issue of how to 
persuade national leaders in seller nations to participate in friendly 
deals for the sale of sovereign control.25 Until these leaders’ incentives 
change, however, it is difficult to see how a robust market for sovereign 
control will develop. 
II.  HOSTILE DEALS IN THE MARKET FOR SOVEREIGN CONTROL 
In a hostile deal concluded in the market for sovereign control, 
one sovereign refuses to consent to the annexation of one of its regions 
by another sovereign. In these cases, Blocher and Gulati argue that the 
annexation may occur over the objection of the parent nation so long 
as three conditions are met. First, the region’s citizens must have been 
mildly oppressed by the parent nation.26 Second, the region’s citizens 
must vote in favor of the transfer.27 If each of these two conditions is 
satisfied, then control over the region will pass to the new sovereign. 
The former parent nation will, however, be entitled to compensation 
for the loss. This payment of compensation is Blocher and Gulati’s 
third condition. 
In order to facilitate the conclusion of hostile deals, Blocher and 
Gulati argue that international law should be rewritten to incorporate 
the three conditions outlined above. Where a region’s citizens have 
been mistreated in some manner, and wish to join up with a new 
sovereign, international law should mandate that they be permitted to 
 
 22. Id. at 804. 
 23. Id. at 805. 
 24. Id. at 804, 805, 843.  
 25. The international-relations literature relating to succession suggests that these 
workarounds are likely to vary depending on the individual circumstances of each state. See Ryan 
Griffiths, Secession and the Invisible Hand of the International System, 40 REV. INT’L STUD. 559, 
580–81 (2014). 
 26. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 1, at 819–20. 
 27. Id. at 819. 
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do so. At the same time, international law should also mandate that 
compensation be paid to the former parent nation. Once these rules 
are implemented, Blocher and Gulati argue, they will help to bring 
about the creation of a market for sovereign control by making it easier 
for nations to acquire territory over the objections of other nations. 
It is possible, though by no means certain, that the act of rewriting 
the rules of international law to incorporate these rules would be 
welfare enhancing. It is, however, difficult to envision a scenario under 
which any of these rules would ever be accorded the status of law in 
the international system. International law rests on the foundation of 
state consent.28 The two primary sources of international law are 
treaties and CIL.29 Treaties are written agreements between sovereign 
nations.30 CIL is created by widespread state practice that is 
undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation.31 If a state refuses to ratify 
a treaty, or if it persistently objects to a rule of CIL, then it will not be 
bound by that rule because it will have withheld its consent.32 In order 
for the rules proposed by Blocher and Gulati to take effect, therefore, 
the states against which these rules may someday be enforced must 
consent to their creation. In effect, these states must voluntarily 
commit themselves ex ante to a set of rules that could lead to their 
dissolution ex post.33 Since the overriding goal of sovereign states in the 
international system is self-preservation, it is not clear why any existing 
state would ever grant its consent to such a rule.34 Why would any 
 
 28. ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2005). 
 29. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 25–36. 
 30. Id. at 31. 
 31. Id. at 25–27. 
 32. This is the persistent-objector doctrine. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and 
Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 
765 n.90 (2001). Many would argue that all states are bound, regardless of consent, by norms that 
have attained the status of jus cogens. See Connie de la Vega, Jus Cogens, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 301, 301 (David P. Forsythe ed., 2009). This is the basis for the doctrine of 
remedial secession, which gives regions the rights to secede if their inhabitants are subjected to 
widespread human rights violations. See Christopher J. Borgen, The Language of Law and the 
Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo 
and South Ossetia, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (2009). Claims of “mild” oppression, however, do not 
constitute jus cogens violations and hence are not exempt from the consent requirement. 
 33. See John Hickman, The New Territorial Imperative, 29 COMP. STRATEGY 405, 409–10 
(2010) (“Sovereign territorial states appear ‘hardwired’ to acquire additional territory when 
opportunities arise because new territory represents potential additional power resources in their 
interaction with other states.”). 
 34. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. I, ch. 2, § 16 (1854) (“[E]very nation 
is obliged to perform the duty of self-preservation.”); Richard A. Falk, Book Review: Philosophy 
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nation agree to be bound by a rule that would make it easier for rival 
nations to poach its territory over its objections? 
Even if these proposed rules were to come into existence 
somehow, moreover, it is not clear who would enforce them against 
non-compliant states. If a parent nation refused to permit a region to 
exit in exchange for consideration, what remedies would be available 
to the region? Although they are not explicit on this point, Blocher and 
Gulati seem to contemplate a role for international tribunals in 
enforcing these rules against non-compliant parent nations.35 If a 
parent nation is unwilling to permit a region to break away in the first 
instance, however, then it is not at all clear why it would change its 
position in response to a decision by an international tribunal.36 To be 
sure, the threat of force may induce compliance with these rules. The 
very need to threaten force would, however, undo many (if not all) of 
the benefits of the market framework that Blocher and Gulati propose.  
Consider a scenario in which Tibet wants to secede from China 
and become a part of Nepal. The citizens of Tibet have legitimate 
complaints of oppression. Against all odds, China permits the citizens 
of Tibet to hold a referendum.37 In this referendum, the citizens of 
Tibet vote overwhelmingly to join Nepal. A consortium of wealthy 
nations offers to pay a massive sum of money to China to compensate 
it for the loss of Tibet. In response, China refuses to accept the money, 
 
of International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 902, 907 (2008) (arguing that the efficacy of international 
law has been “fatally undermined in the modern era by its overriding . . . embrace of an 
unconditional, sovereign right of self-preservation as the final arbiter of behavior in world 
politics”); Oscar Schachter, The Nature and Process of Legal Development in International 
Society, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 745, 748 (R. St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston 
eds., 1991) (“In the present society of sovereign states, the most promising candidate for [their] 
supreme interest would be self-preservation of the state.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Blocher & Gulati, supra note 1, at 821 (suggesting that if a parent nation were 
dissatisfied with the market-determined price for an exiting region, it could seek review by an 
international body such as the International Court of Justice). 
 36. The parent nation could, moreover, prevent the tribunal from hearing the dispute by 
refusing to consent to its jurisdiction. See Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. 
Fr./UK/U.S.), Judgment, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 19, 32 (June 15); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern 
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 832 (1997). 
 37. In the real world, China would assuredly take steps to ensure that no referendum were 
ever held. The ability of a parent state to block a referendum in the region—an essential 
component in Blocher and Gulati’s proposed framework—represents still another obstacle that 
would need to be addressed in order for hostile deals to proceed over the objection of the current 
parent state. 
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ignores the results of the vote, and deploys several brigades to patrol 
the border between Nepal and Tibet. China announces to the world 
that Tibet is a part of China and will remain a part of China. Nepal 
knows that it would lose any military conflict with China. No other 
nation is willing to intervene militarily on Tibet’s behalf. What is the 
most likely outcome? Tibet remains a part of China. Significantly, this 
is the most likely outcome even if the fact that the rules proposed by 
Blocher and Gulati have formally become a part of international law 
and all of the conditions for a transfer pursuant to those rules have 
been satisfied. The existence of a valid and binding international-law 
rule relating to sovereign control is, in short, meaningless in the 
absence of a valid and effective mechanism for enforcing that rule 
against nations that refuse to comply. 
This is not the only enforcement challenge implicated by Blocher 
and Gulati’s proposal. If a nation has successfully annexed a piece of 
territory from another nation over its objections, how can the nation 
on the losing end of the transfer force the new parent nation to pay 
compensation? This question is presented in the ongoing dispute over 
Crimea. On March 16, 2014, the residents of Crimea voted to leave 
Ukraine and become a part of Russia.38 The Ukrainian government 
protested the legitimacy of the vote and argued that the secession was 
illegal. Russia ignored these protests and quickly moved to assert 
military and political control over Crimea. Under Blocher and Gulati’s 
framework, Russia would be obligated to pay compensation to 
Ukraine. Russia does not, however, want to pay such compensation. 
Indeed, it will vigorously resist any attempt to force it to do so. Ukraine 
will argue that Russia must pay. Russia will refuse. Ukraine will insist. 
Russia will again refuse.  
At this point, Ukraine will have only two options. First, it could go 
to war with Russia. This course of action may not be attractive for any 
number of reasons, not the least of which being the very real possibility 
that Ukraine would lose the war and suffer a further loss of territory. 
Second, Ukraine could ask an international tribunal to force Russia to 
pay it the compensation that it is owed. Russia is, however, unlikely to 
agree to submit the dispute to an international tribunal.39 Even if CIL 
 
 38. Thomas D. Grant, Current Developments: Annexation of Crimea, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 68, 
69 (2015). 
 39. A possible exception, as noted above, is when massive human rights violations trigger a 
right of remedial secession. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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were somehow rewritten to give Ukraine a right to compensation, it 
would have no obvious means of forcing Russia to comply with its 
obligation to pay without resorting to force.40  
There exist, in other words, significant practical obstacles arising 
from (1) the process through which international law is made and (2) 
the enforcement of international law against non-compliant states. 
These obstacles make it difficult to imagine how the hostile deals 
envisaged by Blocher and Gulati will come together. Indeed, one might 
question whether the framework that Blocher and Gulati describe is, 
strictly speaking, one that facilitates market transactions. Market 
transactions are generally understood to refer to voluntary exchanges 
between willing buyers and sellers. Friendly deals, in other words. To 
describe a payment by Russia to Ukraine to compensate it for the 
annexation of Crimea as a market transaction is to stretch the 
definition of that term to its breaking point. An ex post payment to 
compensate one actor for property that has been seized by another is 
typically characterized as a tort remedy, not a market transaction. 
Another way of conceptualizing the framework that Blocher and 
Gulati propose, therefore, is as a system of compensated takings.41 
Assuming certain conditions are met, one nation may legally annex the 
territory of another. The nation whose territory is taken shall, however, 
be entitled to a remedy in tort for damages. This arrangement may be 
welfare enhancing. It may lead to beneficial cross-border competition 
 
 40. In the specific case of Crimea, Ukraine could (in theory) ask the English judge overseeing 
a dispute between itself and Russia relating to a $3 billion loan to give it a setoff to compensate it 
for the loss of Crimea. See Elaine Moore & Neil Buckley, Ukraine’s “You Invaded Us” Debt Non-
Payment Defense, FIN. TIMES (May 27, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/976b426c-2424-11e6-
aa98-db1e01fabc0c [https://perma.cc/57EH-REB5]. In order for a judge to order such a setoff, 
however, he would first have to conclude that international law mandates that compensation be 
paid. Since Russia has ratified no treaty to that effect, and since it would almost certainly object 
to any attempt to develop such a rule via CIL, there would be no legal basis for the setoff, 
notwithstanding the fact that both states have consented to the jurisdiction of the English court. 
In addition, the bonds in question affirmatively prohibit set offs. In order for Ukraine to prevail 
on this point, therefore, it would also have to persuade the English court to disregard that 
particular clause. 
 41. This insight is implicit in Blocher and Gulati’s proposal that a nation’s sovereignty rights 
be made subject to a liability rule rather than a property rule. See Blocher & Gulati, supra note 1, 
at 803; see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing distinction 
between property rules and liability rules). 
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between and among governments. It is not, however, a “market” 
transaction as that term is traditionally understood.42 
CONCLUSION 
International law has long recognized the ability of sovereigns to 
buy and sell territory in friendly deals. In the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, such sales were common. In the years after 1945, 
however, they essentially ceased to occur. The sudden halt in such sales 
is not attributable to any new rule of international law. Nor is it 
attributable to a lack of awareness that they are permitted. In recent 
years, commentators have called for (1) the United Kingdom to sell 
Northern Ireland to the Republic of Ireland,43 (2) Japan to sell the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to China,44 (3) India to offer to purchase parts 
of Kashmir from Pakistan,45 and (4) the United Kingdom to sell the 
Falkland Islands to Argentina.46 The obstacles are political, and they 
are largely intractable. Until these political obstacles are addressed, it 
is difficult to see how a market for sovereign control for friendly deals 
will develop. 
With respect to hostile deals in which one nation is forced to cede 
a region to another nation against its wishes, there is no existing rule of 
international law that would require the ceding nation to relinquish its 
sovereignty. There is also no rule that would require that a payment be 
made to compensate a nation that loses a region. Blocher and Gulati 
propose that these rules can and should change. They argue that 
nations should be required to cede territories to other sovereigns when 
 
 42. In transactions that occur pursuant to a liability-rule regime, the courts will set the price 
and may order the exchange to proceed over the objections of one of the parties. See generally 
Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, Property Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 232 
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). In light of these attributes, some scholars have 
described liability-rule exchanges as “involuntary” or “non-market” transactions. See, e.g., 
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35 (2010); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1719, 1777 (2004). 
 43. See Mary Dejevsky, Opinion, Is It Time to Sell Northern Ireland to the Republic?, 
BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/is-it-time-to-
sell-northern-ireland-to-the-republic-28556047.html [https://perma.cc/RT5H-DGCQ]. 
 44. See Walt, supra note 15. 
 45. Jug Suraiya, India Should Offer to Buy ‘Azad Kashmir’ from Pakistan, TIMES OF INDIA 
BLOGS (Oct. 29, 2013), http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/jugglebandhi/states-estates-
india-should-offer-to-buy-azad-kashmir-from-pakistan [https://perma.cc/A6VP-HPM7]. 
 46. PETITION TO SELL THE FALKLAND ISLANDS TO PAY THE UK DEFICIT 
https://petition.parliament.uk/archived/petitions/26149 [https://perma.cc/2GDS-Z6TW]. 
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the region’s citizens are ill-treated and vote to exit, subject to the 
condition that the ceding nation be compensated for its loss. It is, 
however, difficult to see why the nations of the world would consent to 
the creation of any of these rules. Nor is it easy to see how these rules 
would be enforced against nations that refuse to comply or why these 
exchanges should be characterized as market transactions as opposed 
to compensated takings. Blocher and Gulati deserve credit for writing 
a fascinating article that explores the benefits that may flow from 
making it easier to transfer sovereignty from one nation to another. 
There are, however, a great many challenges that would need to be 
overcome before their vision becomes a reality. 
 
